CVE-2026-82391

Description

The HTTP/2 front-end of the Zephyr HTTP server aliased connection receive state as a scratch output. In subsys/net/lib/http/http_server_http2.c, handle_http2_static_fs_resource() passed &client->data_len as the file_size out-parameter of http_server_find_file(). client->data_len is the count of unprocessed bytes remaining in the fixed-size per-connection receive buffer client->buffer[CONFIG_HTTP_SERVER_CLIENT_BUFFER_SIZE] (256 bytes by default), an invariant every frame handler and the socket receive path rely on. Serving any static file therefore replaced that bounded value with the file's on-disk size, and nothing resets it afterwards. The defect is reached by an unauthenticated HTTP/2 GET for any file under the web root, in applications that register a static-filesystem resource (HTTP_RESOURCE_TYPE_STATIC_FS) with CONFIG_FILE_SYSTEM=y; CONFIG_HTTP_SERVER_VERSION_2 is enabled by default and no TLS or credentials are required on this path. Once client->data_len exceeds the buffer size, the frame dispatch loop in subsys/net/lib/http/http_server_core.c keeps parsing past the end of the received data, and the peer controls the bytes at client->cursor, so it can choose which fabricated frame the state machine consumes next by appending bytes after its request. The inflated length defeats the only guards on the buffer. parse_http_frame_header() and the per-frame handlers read and skip up to a 24-bit frame length beyond the buffer (out-of-bounds read); the compaction memmove(client->buffer, client->cursor, client->data_len) at the end of request handling copies the file-size number of bytes into the 256-byte buffer, overflowing the rest of struct http_client_ctx — including the current_detail/current_stream pointers, the parser_settings function-pointer table and the inactivity_timer work handler — and the adjacent client contexts in static memory; and the subsequent zsock_recv(client->fd, client->buffer + client->data_len, sizeof(client->buffer) - client->data_len, 0) underflows its size argument, writing attacker-supplied data of attacker-chosen length out of bounds. The impact is remote memory corruption in the server's single address space: at minimum a crash or hang of the device, and plausibly control-data overwrite leading to code execution. The HTTP/1 and HTTP/3 static-filesystem handlers already used a local variable and are unaffected; the fix makes the HTTP/2 handler use a local size_t file_size as well.

Severity
CRITICAL
CVSS v3
9.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H · source cna
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.782%
chance of exploitation in the next 30 days
higher than 56.7% of scored CVEs · 2026-11-18
CISA KEV
Not listed
Public exploit code
None public
Exploit references (NVD and CNA): 0
Metasploit modules: 0
Nuclei templates: 0

Weakness

CISA SSVC decision points

Exploitationnone
Automatableyes
Technical impactpartial
Scored2026-11-13

Timeline

  1. 2026-11-10Published by the CNA22:07 UTC
  2. 2026-11-13CISA SSVC decision recorded3 days after publication

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Affected products

Products listed as vulnerable. Upgrade to the version under "Fixed in", or a later one.

ProductVulnerable versionsFixed in
zephyrproject zephyrfrom 4.0.0 before 4.3.2fixed in 4.3.2from 4.4.0 before 4.5.0fixed in 4.5.04.3.24.5.0

Products and versions as NVD and the vendor that published the CVE list them.

References

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Sources