CVE-2026-93666

Description

The Bluetooth Classic SDP client built its outgoing request PDUs with bt_sdp_create_pdu(), which allocates from the sdp_pool net-buf pool with a K_FOREVER timeout and no failure handling, in sdp_client_ss_search(), sdp_client_sa_search() and sdp_client_ssa_search() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c. All of these run on the Bluetooth workqueue bt_workq (via sdp_client_work_handler(), the L2CAP sdp_client_connected() callback, or the continuation-state follow-up from a received response), which is the same single thread that dispatches incoming HCI ACL and event traffic, drives L2CAP, and performs connection and channel teardown. sdp_pool holds only CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN buffers (one by default) and is shared with the SDP server role. An unauthenticated peer within BR/EDR range can drive both halves of the trigger. The SDP L2CAP server is registered at BT_SECURITY_L0, so any inbound SDP request makes the device allocate the pool's buffer for a response, which is held until the controller has transmitted it. The same peer can then cause a client request to be issued while the pool is empty: in-tree profiles start SDP discovery from inbound connection callbacks (for example hfp_hf_accept() calls bt_sdp_discover() through hfp_hf_create(), and hfp_ag.c mirrors this), and a peer acting as an SDP server can force repeated client requests by answering with partial responses carrying continuation state. With the pool empty, the allocation blocks uninterruptibly and freezes the entire Bluetooth host. The stall becomes permanent when the release of the outstanding buffer itself depends on the blocked workqueue: if the link carrying the queued PDU is dropped or stalls, hci_disconn_complete() and the L2CAP channel cleanup that purges the channel TX queue are themselves bt_workq work items, so the buffer is never returned. The result is an unrecoverable denial of service of all Bluetooth functionality until reboot; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality or integrity impact. The fix allocates client PDUs with K_NO_WAIT via a new sdp_client_create_pdu(), propagates -ENOBUFS, parks the session on a new SDP_CLIENT_FLAG_WAIT_FOR_TX_BUF flag, and adds an sdp_pool destructor that re-submits the SDP client worker when a buffer becomes available. Note that the SDP server role still allocated from the same pool with K_FOREVER at this commit; that path was addressed separately.

Severity
MEDIUM
CVSS v3
5.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H · source cna
Exploit chance (EPSS)
0.127%
chance of exploitation in the next 30 days
higher than 2.4% of scored CVEs · 2026-11-17
CISA KEV
Not listed
Public exploit code
None public
Exploit references (NVD and CNA): 0
Metasploit modules: 0
Nuclei templates: 0

Weakness

CISA SSVC decision points

Exploitationnone
Automatableno
Technical impactpartial
Scored2026-11-17

Timeline

  1. 2026-11-16Published by the CNA21:19 UTC
  2. 2026-11-16Published in NVD22:18 UTC · 59 minutes after the CNA
  3. 2026-11-17CISA SSVC decision recorded1 day after publication

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Affected products

Products listed as vulnerable. Upgrade to the version under "Fixed in", or a later one.

ProductVulnerable versionsFixed in
zephyrproject zephyrfrom 1.7.0 before 4.5.0fixed in 4.5.04.5.0

Products and versions as NVD and the vendor that published the CVE list them.

References

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Sources